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ESSAY
FIRMS, COURTS, AND REPUTATION MECHANISMS:
TOWARDS A POSITIVE THEORY OF
PRIVATE ORDERING
Barak D. Richman*
This Essay formulates a positive model that predicts when commercial
parties will employ private ordering to enforce their agreements. The typical
enforcement mechanism associated with private ordering is the reputation
mechanism, in which a merchant community punishes parties in breach of
contract by denying them future business. The growing private ordering
literature argues that these private enforcement mechanisms can be superior
to the traditional, less efficient enforcement measures provided by public
courts. However, previous comparisons between public and private contractual enforcement have presented a misleading dichotomy by failing to consider a third enforcement mechanism: the vertically integrated firm.
This Essay develops a model that comprehensively addresses three distinct types of enforcement mechanisms—firms, courts, and reputation-based
private ordering. The model rests on a synthesis of transaction cost economics, which compares the efficiencies of firms versus markets, and the private
ordering literature, which compares the efficiencies of public courts versus
private ordering. It hypothesizes that private ordering will arise when agreements present enforcement difficulties, high-powered market incentives are
important, and the costs of entry barriers are low. The Essay then conducts
an illustrative test by comparing the model’s predictions to documented instances of private ordering.
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INTRODUCTION
The fascinating literature on private ordering, which aims to understand how parties enforce contracts without relying on public courts, unfortunately suffers from a damaging case of tunnel vision. This narrow
focus is illustrated paradigmatically in the opening line of John McMillan
and Christopher Woodruff’s excellent survey, “Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order,” an article that articulates how Asian merchants,
American fish wholesalers, eleventh-century Maghribi traders, and many
other merchant communities employ similar extralegal mechanisms to
enforce agreements.1 McMillan and Woodruff begin: “Businesspeople
need contractual assurance.”2 A more accurate opening would have been
“Businesspeople need transactional assurance,” where contracts and assorted regimes of contract enforcement comprise only one category of
devices that produce the needed assurance. Their terminology reveals
the inclination, unfortunately common in the literature, to look singularly at contracts to the exclusion of alternative mechanisms that secure
transactions; but it also presents an opportunity to relate the private ordering literature to the larger literature on transactional governance.
This Essay attempts to place private ordering within a broader theoretical context by weaving together two parallel strands of new institutional theory. The first lies in the original formulation of transaction cost
economics, whose primary exercise contrasts the institutional attributes
of firms against those of markets and predicts whether transactions will
occur between autonomous agents or within a vertically integrated firm
(alternatively coined the “make-or-buy question”). The second strand
arises from the younger literature on private ordering, which compares
the efficiencies of private (extralegal) contract enforcement with the
more traditional use of public law and state-run courts. The analysis
presented in this Essay is a straightforward, though previously unexplored, combination of these two approaches. It begins with the observa1. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional
Public Order, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2421, 2433–36 (2000) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff,
Dysfunctional Public Order].
2. Id. at 2421.
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tion that three distinct enforcement mechanisms emerge from these two
literatures: (1) public courts, where transactors are autonomous and contract enforcement follows common contract law; (2) private ordering,
where transactors are autonomous and employ extralegal mechanisms to
enforce contracts; and (3) the vertically integrated firm, where transactions occur within a single legal entity and are secured through administrative control, and contract law plays no direct role in enforcement.
Prior scholarship has neither examined all three governance mechanisms
within a single model nor developed a comprehensive understanding of
their comparative proficiencies in relation to each other.3
This Essay’s primary objective is to begin formulating a positive
model that predicts when one should expect to see systems of private law.
It further aims to bring some coherence to the private ordering literature—illustrating that private law is not merely a convenient or necessary
replacement for public courts but rather arises systematically and predictably—and to fill the theoretical blind spot created by the literature’s legal-centric perspective.4 It proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief
overview of the recent literature on private ordering and identifies a conceptual puzzle that arises when systems of private law encounter and persist into modernity. Part II develops the predictive model. It explores
three principal mechanisms employed to secure transactions—public
3. Gillian Hadfield’s recent chapter deserves credit for including self-enforcement
and vertical integration as two of the “many potential enforcement mechanisms available
to support agreements,” but her list of alternative governance mechanisms is discussed
only sequentially and is not part of a comprehensive theory. See Gillian K. Hadfield,
Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal Institutions That Support Contractual
Commitments, in Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Claude Menard & Mary
Shirley eds., forthcoming 2004). Yochai Benkler’s work, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and
The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369, 371–74 (2002), constitutes a related effort to
understand unusual systems of organization within the market-versus-firm framework. I
relate his model to my own in Part III.
4. See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. Legal Pluralism 1, 17–21 (1981). Galanter was an early critic of what
he called “legal centralism,” a label he borrowed from John Griffiths, What is Legal
Pluralism?, 24 J. Legal Pluralism 1, 3 (1986), and a concept explored by a few others. See,
e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 215, 215–18 (1994) [hereinafter, Cooter,
Structural Adjudication] (comparing the inefficiencies of centralized lawmaking to those
of centralized economic planning, and arguing that judges should defer to regional
customary norms). However, Galanter uses the term slightly differently from the way it is
used here. Galanter criticizes a “state-centered view of the legal phenomena,” in which
scholars tend to discuss only those legal instruments found in public courts, to the
exclusion of the broad array of private enforcement mechanisms. Galanter, supra, at 1 &
n.1. Of course, as Part I discusses, there now is a healthy private ordering scholarship, and
Galanter’s criticism currently holds less force. The legal-centric perspective I critique is
slightly different—it is a tendency to discuss only those enforcement mechanisms that
relate to contracts and contract law, whether state-sponsored or privately developed, to the
exclusion of the firm and other hierarchical institutions. I nonetheless borrow Galanter’s
term because while the substance of his critique differs from that of mine, the tendencies
we address are virtually identical.
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courts, private ordering, and the firm—and examines the economic attributes of each. The key lesson from the model is that each governance
mechanism has its own strengths and weaknesses, suggesting that each
will systematically arise under different circumstances. Part III then illustratively tests the model developed in Part II by comparing its predictions
to empirical findings in the literature on private ordering and merchant
networks.
Lastly, Part IV compares the approach employed in this Essay with
those approaches from this Essay’s theoretical antecedents, and it is
worth summarizing that Part and highlighting the Essay’s theoretical contributions at the outset. This Essay’s contribution to transaction cost economics is its extension of the transaction cost understanding of private
ordering from the bilateral to the multilateral context. Such a shift
makes necessary the introduction of an additional variable—entry barriers—to the transaction cost paradigm’s staple considerations of incentive
intensity and transactional security. Entry barriers do not hinder vertical
integration, but they are inescapable in reputation-based private ordering. Consequently, the traditional transaction cost tradeoff—between
high-powered incentives and transactional governance—is joined by a
second tradeoff between high-powered incentives and entry barriers (private ordering has both and vertical integration has neither). Incorporating these two tradeoffs into a single analysis requires a departure from
the traditional unidimensional model of governance mechanisms, which
spans from markets to firms, and a move towards the slightly more complicated model described in Part II.
The Essay also notably departs from the current private ordering
literature, particularly the scholarship of Lisa Bernstein.5 The current
scholarship focuses on comparing the administrative costs of public versus private systems and generally concludes that certain merchant communities resort to self-enforcement and shun public courts as a means of
garnering substantial administrative efficiencies. Consequently, these
past analyses occupy the spaces within “the shadow of the law”6—areas
5. Lisa Bernstein’s scholarship has spawned much of the recent attention to private
ordering and privately tailored commercial law. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Business Norms] (describing the
private arbitration system used by grain and feed traders); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal
Stud. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamonds] (same, for New York’s diamond
industry); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton] (same, for the cotton industry).
6. Acknowledging the “shadow of the law” requires recognizing that the “principle
contribution of courts to dispute resolution is providing a background of norms and
procedures against which negotiations and regulation in both private and governmental
settings take place.” Galanter, supra note 4, at 6. Martin Shapiro deserves credit for first
using the shadow imagery. See Martin Shapiro, Courts, in 5 Handbook of Political Science
321, 321 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (noting general lack of
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where public courts are ultimately effective and cast down parameters
within which private ordering and negotiation occur. This Essay argues
that concerns over transactional assurance and contractual enforcement,
not efforts to economize on administrative costs, drive merchant communities to private ordering (and to vertical integration as well). The focus
is not on courts’ costliness but on their ultimate futility, where administrative savings are merely the cart that follows the horse. This Essay’s perspective draws parallels between the inclination towards private ordering
and the attractiveness of vertical integration, and the result is a unified
model that compares both instruments of securing transactions. These
issues are elaborated in Part IV, and a brief conclusion follows.
Before going forward, it is important to add a cautionary remark.
The model described herein is not designed to deal comprehensively
with all the variables that may be relevant in predicting the efficacy or
prevalence of private ordering. To be sure, private ordering systems are
richly varied, and ultimately, any successful self-enforcing contractual regime must rely on many details that are not easily generalizeable or captured in a parsimonious model.7 Moreover, it should be noted that transaction cost economics is only one of several competing schools of
organizational economics, and some (but not all) of the conclusions
drawn here may not hold for those who subscribe to alternative understandings of the firm.8 Specifically, the assertion that vertically integrated
delineation between courts and other systems of adjudication); see also Galanter, supra
note 4, at 8 n.11. The phrase was popularized by Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser
in their study of negotiations surrounding divorce settlements. See Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J.
950, 968 (1979).
7. The prerequisites for an effective reputation-based system of private ordering are
likely quite demanding. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous
and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 159, 167–69 (1991) [hereinafter
Williamson, Spontaneous and Intentional Governance] (detailing the rigorous
requirements to support trust-based exchange and the many factors that could disrupt
such exchange systems). For a detailed illustration of one reputation-based system of
exchange that does meet these prerequisites and that operates effectively, see Barak D.
Richman, How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in
New York 22–51 (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper No. 384, Sept. 2004), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=349040 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
8. Compare Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985)
[hereinafter Williamson, EIC] (examining economic organization through lens of
transaction cost economics), with Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
(1995) (describing economic organizations as allocations of residual control in property
ownership rights), Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976)
(presenting an agency theory of the firm), and Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The
Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, 116 Q.J.
Econ. 805 (2001) (articulating a theory of economic organization resting on dedicated
hierarchies). It should be noted, however, that transaction cost economics has met a
substantial amount of empirical success. See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein,
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L.
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firms exhibit attributes that are distinct from market contractual relations—which is held by transaction cost economics and is incorporated
into this analysis—is not entirely shared by competing schools.9 For these
reasons, the central message of this Essay lies not in the model’s particular dimensions but in the general illustration that two important tensions
that previously have only been addressed separately—namely, firm versus
market on one hand and private versus public ordering on the other—
are in fact part of a single equation and should be handled simultaneously in a comprehensive model. This general message, however, constitutes a contribution that comports with all schools of organizational economics, and though the specific hypotheses herein may not meet
universal agreement, the progress towards a comprehensive model
should.
I. SHASTA COUNTY RANCHERS, ULTRA-ORTHODOX JEWS, AND AMERICA’S
FISHMONGERS: THE MANY FACES OF PRIVATE ORDERING AND
ITS ENCOUNTER WITH MODERNITY
Two characteristics make the private ordering literature rich for theoretical development. First, it constitutes a relatively new area of research, with its beginnings (or, if distant ancestors are given credit,10 its
Econ. & Org. 335, 341–50 (1995) (reviewing several applications of transaction cost
approach); see also Christopher S. Boerner & Jeffrey T. Macher, Transaction Cost
Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (last visited Sept.
20, 2004), available at http://www.msb.edu/faculty/jtm4/Papers/JLEO.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing transaction cost economics literature).
9. Jensen and Meckling, for example, describe the firm as a “nexus of a set of
contracting relationships,” which suggests that the transactional governance offered by a
firm can be replicated by contract. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 311.
10. For some antecedents to the recent private ordering literature, see generally
Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68
Am. Econ. Rev. 28, 30–31 (1978) (implying that search methods used by market actors
serve as enforcement mechanisms in absence of reliable courtroom dispute resolution
techniques); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 60–62 (1963) (making the important observation that much
contract enforcement occurs outside courtrooms); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social
Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. &
Soc’y Rev. 719, 742–45 (1973) (describing rules that are enforceable both in conjunction
with and absent state power). These early works made the important observation that
much contract enforcement occurs outside the courtroom (or, in the case of developing
countries, despite the lack of a reliable courtroom). These works were followed by
scholarship in the 1990s which formulated the first assessments of the efficiency of private
enforcement.
A related literature on relational contracts, where both the terms and the
enforcement of an agreement are embedded within a bilaterally dependent relationship,
emerged in the 1970s and involved both legal and economic scholars. Ian Macneil is
heralded as the pioneer who identified the important distinction between discrete and
relational transactions. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev.
691, 694–96 (1974) (arguing that prevalence of “relational patterns” in modern economic
society “justifies examination of the many futures of contracts in relations and their
contrast with the singular future of contract in discrete transactions”). He later articulated
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recent resurgence) reaching back only to the early 1990s. Second, it contains genuinely interesting stories. Robert Ellickson, in Order Without
Law,11 contributed to both features when he observed that Shasta
County’s ranchers—contrary to the predictions of both Ronald Coase’s
seminal 1967 article12 and much of the law and economics literature—
ignore legal rules and settle disputes relying on their own principles
(which Ellickson argues are wealth maximizing). Other early works include Avner Greif’s studies of eleventh-century Maghribi traders,13 Lisa
Bernstein’s examination of Ultra-Orthodox Jewish diamond merchants,14
the contrasting legal needs of both types of transactions and, appropriately, neoclassical
law’s recognition of those differences. Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U. L. Rev. 854, 859–76 (1978). Charles Goetz and Robert Scott offered a valuable
refinement of how relational contracts arise and the legal problems that follow. See
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089,
1095–1111 (1981) (identifying conditions that produce variations in the nature and form
of relational contracts). Economists employed the relational contract model to describe
kinship or clan-based transactions, public utility regulation, franchise agreements, and
reciprocal trading agreements. See Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families,
Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 Population & Dev. Rev. 1, 1
(1980) (describing the family as “the locale of transactions in which identity dominates”);
Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J. Econ. 426, 426–27
(1976) (describing public utility regulation as relational “administered” contracts featuring
ongoing relationships and reliance by individuals on agents); Benjamin Klein, Transaction
Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 356, 358–60
(1980) (analyzing characteristics of contractual relationships between franchisors and
franchisees); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 530 (1983) [hereinafter Williamson, Credible
Commitments] (arguing that expropriation hazards within the “hostage model” can be
avoided by expanding the contracting relationship from unilateral to bilateral); Oliver E.
Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect to
CATV, 7 Bell J. Econ. 73, 91 (1976) (describing public utility regulation as a long-term
contract within which adaptations to inevitably changing circumstances require
institutional support). This valuable literature continues to inform our economic and
legal understanding of bilateral transactions that deviate from the classical contract
paradigm and inherently involve some aspect of self-enforcement. See generally Oliver E.
Williamson, Mechanisms of Governance 95–97, 370 (1996) [hereinafter Williamson,
MOG] (outlining elements of identity, autonomy, and bilateral dependence in neoclassical
contract law).
11. Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 52–56
(1991).
12. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 3–8 (1960) (theorizing
that liability rules determine the direction of wealth transfers, if not the ultimate allocation
of resources, in the resolution of conflicts over competing property uses).
13. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early
Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 525, 527–28 (1993)
[hereinafter Greif, Contract Enforceability] (describing structures governing Maghribi
traders); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 857, 858 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, Reputation and
Coalitions] (examining institutions that enabled eleventh-century Mediterranean
merchants to enforce contracts with overseas agents).
14. Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5.
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and Milgrom, North, and Weingast’s exploration into Medieval Europe’s
merchant guilds.15 Each of these works explored fascinating merchant
communities and uncovered similarly organized reputation mechanisms
that induced certain mutually and socially beneficial behavior (in Shasta
County, a particular code of neighborly conduct, and in the latter three
works, the fulfillment of contractual obligations). The basic underlying
structures were the same in each of these communities: Parties benefit
from ongoing transactions with their colleagues; in each transaction, parties have an opportunity to cheat their counterparts; if a party cheats any
other party, that party’s misconduct becomes known throughout the
community; and no one will transact with any individual known to have
cheated in the past. Thus, a party’s good reputation ensures the opportunity to benefit from future transactions, and inversely, the prospect of
future beneficial transactions induces cooperative behavior. In gametheoretic language, the assurance of ex post sanctions against cheaters
allows transactors to commit credibly to fellow merchants that they will
fulfill their contractual duties.
Over a dozen other articles followed, each identifying a merchant
community that used reputation mechanisms to enforce commercial
agreements.16 An important feature emerging from this literature is the
discovery that each of the different systems of private enforcement falls
into one of two categories: those that arise where private law is employed
because reliable state-sponsored contract enforcement is unavailable, and
those that arise where public courts are available but where private law is
preferable. Merchant communities that fall into the first category include those in early commercial societies, which predated modern state
institutions and contract law,17 modern-day communities in third-world
societies where contract law and independent judiciaries are not yet well
developed,18 and members of mafia or other criminal networks whose
15. Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1, 4–6 (1990)
(describing the use of private judges by European merchants during early middle ages).
This body of scholarship is particularly important because it models how coordination
among a merchant community can support multilateral exchange without relying on statesponsored courts. See Milgrom et al., supra; Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 13;
Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 13.
16. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2443,
2444 tbl.2, for a thorough overview of the recent literature.
17. See, e.g., Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican
California, 13 J.L. Econ. & Org. 202, 202 (1997) (examining private contractual
enforcement among Spanish merchants in 1830s California); Greif, Contract
Enforceability, supra note 13, at 528–31 (same, for eleventh-century Mediterranean
merchants); Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 13, at 860 (same); Milgrom et al.,
supra note 15, at 4–6 (modeling private adjudication system used by medieval European
traders).
18. See, e.g., Marcel Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in
Ghana, 24 World Dev. 427, 442–43 (1996) (discussing the limited role legal institutions
play in enforcing contracts between Ghanaian firms); John McMillan & Christopher
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transactions involve illegal activity (since state courts refuse to enforce
contracts that involve illegalities).19 These commercial networks resort to
self-enforcement because state contractual enforcement is not a reliable
option. Similarly, the absence of reliable legal institutions also precludes
these merchant communities from employing vertical integration to govern transactions.20 The lack of sophisticated financial markets in developing societies requires difficult self-financing for acquisitions, and the
inability (or, for illegal activity, refusal) of courts to enforce property
rights effectively precludes the possibility of pro rata ownership between
arms-length transactors. Thus, prelegal societies have relied on relational
contracts and private ordering to secure transactions because of the unavailability of other mechanisms such as public law and vertical integration. This first category of communities reveals insights into the ancestors of commercial societies and the utility of modern courts. Most
scholars characterize these enforcement mechanisms as prelaw orders
that are easily supplanted when reliable public ordering emerges.21
The second category of reputation-based enforcement mechanisms
poses a different and more difficult challenge. In these instances, a particular merchant community, which often comprises an entire industry
segment, deliberately declines to rely on available court remedies to enforce agreements. Lisa Bernstein is a leader in uncovering such systems,
including those supporting the Diamond Dealers Club of New York,22 the
National Grain and Feed Association,23 and the assorted trade associations that govern America’s cotton merchants.24 McMillan and Woodruff
uncover similarly organized reputation systems that enforce agreements

Woodruff, Dispute Resolution Without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 637,
640–41 (1999) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff, Vietnam] (describing the use of
reputation mechanisms and private ordering to enforce contracts between Vietnamese
businesspeople); Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement and Trade Liberalization
in Mexico’s Footwear Industry, 26 World Dev. 979, 984–85 (1998) (tracing the evolution of
private contract enforcement in the Mexican footwear industry as trade barriers were
liberalized).
19. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering:
An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 48–51
(2000) (arguing that organized crime provides “response to inefficiencies in the property
rights and enforcement framework supplied by the state”); Richman, supra note 7, at 66.
20. See McMillan & Woodruff, Vietnam, supra note 18, at 644 (attributing, in part,
the lack of vertical integration among Vietnam’s firms to the country’s primitive legal
institutions).
21. See Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: The European
Experience 25–34 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 284,
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=548783 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Greif, Impersonal Exchange].
22. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 124–30.
23. See Bernstein, Business Norms, supra note 5, at Part I.
24. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at Part I.A.
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made to America’s fresh-fish wholesalers and New York’s dress
manufacturers.25
The presence of these two contrasting categories of private ordering
creates an interesting riddle. If early systems of private ordering arose
because of the absence of reliable courts, then why do some systems of
private ordering persist into modern societies?26 Conversely, if private
legal systems enjoy certain efficiencies over public courts, which Lisa
Bernstein’s work carefully articulates, why does economic research overwhelmingly indicate that reliable public courts are central to facilitating
economic growth,27 and correspondingly, why did most instances of private ordering dissolve with the emergence of public courts? Herein is
revealed perhaps another misstatement by McMillan and Woodruff:
They attribute the emergence of private ordering to the “dysfunctional”
nature of public courts (their survey article is entitled “Private Order
Under Dysfunctional Public Order”).28 But that’s too categorical. We
see variation—and upon closer examination, a systematic variation—in
both the persistence and the dissolution of private ordering because both
private and public legal systems have discernible strengths and shortcomings. Consequently, a positive model with identifiable variables should be
able to predict when parties will rely on private ordering even after encountering modernity and obtaining access to reliable public courts.
II. FIRMS, COURTS,

AND

REPUTATION MECHANISMS

Constructing a predictive model for private ordering requires understanding not only the economic properties of such private systems, their
strengths and shortcomings, but also their structural alternatives. The
two alternatives that receive attention here are state-sponsored courts and
vertically integrated firms, and a simple series of comparisons among
these three instruments of transactional governance serves as the model’s
foundations. This is the same skeletal methodology employed in much of
25. McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2436,
2441–42.
26. A popular hypothesis that accompanied examinations of underdeveloped legal
systems was that, in fact, relational contracting and private ordering would inevitably
succumb to public courts. See, e.g., P.J. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence §§ 31–32
(12th ed. 1966); see also Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 4, at 216 (“Many
intellectuals believe that centralized law is inevitable, just as they once believed that
socialism was inevitable.”).
27. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance 110 (1990) (“We have long been aware that the tax structure, regulations,
judicial decisions, and statute laws . . . determine specific aspects of economic
performance . . . .”); Avner Greif & Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement Institutions:
Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in Economic Transition in Eastern
Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform 291, 317–18 (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995) (“In
Russia today, the absence of an appropriate institutional infrastructure for contract
enforcement is producing severe economic problems.”).
28. McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2425.

R

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-8\COL805.txt

2338

unknown

Seq: 11

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

6-DEC-04

12:15

[Vol. 104:2328

the transaction cost literature,29 and the underlying intuition is quite elementary: Each method of enforcement exhibits consistent institutional
competencies that translate into certain relative strengths and weaknesses. Thus, each is comparatively more adept—i.e., transaction-cost
minimizing—than the others for certain transactions, so we will see each
arise systematically to organize transactions of similar attributes. In short,
the nature of the underlying transaction will consistently determine the
superior method of enforcement.30
Examining the attributes and corresponding capabilities of each of
the three distinct institutional arrangements—private ordering, state
courts, and vertical integration—involves employing two rudimentary
comparisons. The first, steeped in the private ordering literature, contrasts state courts and public law with private ordering; and the second,
based on well-developed transaction cost models, compares markets and
firms.
A. Public Versus Private Ordering
The literature on private ordering is chiefly limited to examining
specific case studies where merchant communities enforce agreements
without relying on state-sponsored courts. To the degree that these works
compare systems of private law with public law, the comparison is limited
to explaining why the selected industries shun public courts.31 Thus, the
literature has generated a substantial, albeit self-selected, list of features
of private law that generate efficiencies over the public courts.
Before proceeding to those specific efficiencies, it is useful to review
the basic differences between public and private ordering. The primary
difference is that public enforcement applies to all disputes. It employs a
common body of contract law, and since it enjoys the backing of statesponsored coercion, it can require all losing parties to comply with its
29. For an articulation of the methodology, see Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative
Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 Admin. Sci.
Q. 269, 269 (1991). Note, however, that Williamson’s three-way comparisons among
markets, hierarchies, and hybrids lie across a unidimensional spectrum, where hybrids are
intermediates between the market and hierarchy extremes. Though the methodology is
the same, the three-way comparison here is different because none of the three structural
alternatives—market, firm, and private ordering—is an intermediate of the other two.
30. This is a variation of the “discriminating alignment hypothesis” that serves as a
foundation to transaction cost economics. See id. at 277. According to Williamson, the
discriminating alignment hypothesis “holds that transactions, which differ in their
attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way.” Id.
31. One notable exception is Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus
Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.
15, 20 (1984), which identifies certain advantages in both impersonal court ordering and
relational private ordering. This work stands out because it postulates an equilibrium that
balances the comparative advantages of the two systems. Using a free entry equilibrium, it
shows that if a group of traders surpasses an optimal size, defense of arms-length
contracting in the public courts becomes superior to private enforcement mechanisms. Id.
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legal rulings. Private ordering, in contrast, requires voluntary cooperation by participating merchants.32 It applies a body of specialized law and
procedures to merchants who voluntarily subject themselves to such
rules, and it provides effective transactional security only because all participating members are committed to adhering to industry rules and complying with private arbitrators’ rulings.33 Since failure to comply with
these dictates precludes future business in the industry, losers of arbitration rulings will exhibit compliance only if the benefits from their future
dealings within the merchant community will outweigh their immediate
loss in arbitration.
This lattermost feature—prospects for future transactions inducing
compliance with current contractual obligations—is a mainstay in the
literature on private ordering.34 Thus, similar to the private judges of the
32. Private arbitration panels (such as the Memphis Cotton Exchange and the New
York Diamond Dealers Club) generally invite state courts to enforce their rulings. See
Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 125; Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1737 n.68.
In fact, however, very few private disputes spill into state courts and are instead enforced
exclusively through the threat of private, extralegal sanctions. Bernstein attributes this
exclusivity of private enforcement to the likelihood that an individual who contests an
arbitration decision and forces a fellow merchant to seek a ruling in state court will suffer
doubly—by prompting his own expulsion from the trade association while additionally
earning a reputation as a litigious, uncooperative member of the merchant community.
See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 148; Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at
1737–38. So, despite the alleged enforceability of the arbitration rulings in state court, the
real enforcement power comes from private sanctions. Note that, regardless of the reach
of state courts, this private power limits the reach of the arbitrators only to those beholden
to the prospect of future transactions. This topic is revisited in Part III, infra.
33. Not all systems of private law have private judges or arbitrators. The absence of
such adjudicators in some systems highlights the distinction between “spontaneous” and
“organized” private ordering: In the former, communities police themselves and order
arises spontaneously, whereas in the latter, order requires an organizing, central body that
collects and disseminates players’ reputational information. See McMillan & Woodruff,
Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2425–27; see also Williamson, Spontaneous
and Intentional Governance, supra note 7, at 159 (noting that attention given to “largely
invisible” spontaneous governance has overshadowed “the importance of intentional
governance”). Ellickson’s cattle ranchers present an example of spontaneous ordering,
since the neighbors’ social networks naturally facilitate gossip and information sharing that
are sufficient to induce coordinated behavior. Alternatively, larger merchant
communities—such as New York’s diamond merchants and Memphis’s cotton brokers—
require organized private law, where a body of arbitrators determines where wrongdoing
occurs and publicizes the identity of the wrongdoers.
Nonetheless, the proposition still holds for both spontaneous and organized private
ordering: The reach of private ordering is limited to individuals committed to repeat
interactions with the industry and/or merchant community.
34. Another “darker” form of private ordering relies not on reputations but on
violence. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 19, at 50. In theory, private ordering means
nothing more than employing extralegal mechanisms to induce compliance, and
reputation mechanisms are only a subset of private enforcement mechanisms. This Essay
focuses on reputation mechanisms, however, since they play important roles in modern
commerce and support variegated industries, whereas the role of violence (and other
private mechanisms) is more limited. In addition to violence, reputation mechanisms
remain important even in illegal networks. See Richman, supra note 7, at 49 (noting that
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Champaign Fairs described in the Milgrom, North, and Weingast
model,35 arbitration rulings in private ordering systems serve more as
mechanisms to signal the quality of a merchant’s reputation than as genuine instruments to enforce contractual obligations. A merchant who is
found by a private court to have breached a contract but fails to pay receives publicity as a bad actor, leading other merchants to respond to the
public ruling by refusing to deal with the transgressor.36 The literature is
replete with instances of such coordinated and collectively orchestrated
punishments.37 In sum, public ordering employs the coercive power of
the state, to which all actors are subject, and relies on standard contract
law and litigation rules. In contrast, private ordering relies on reputation
mechanisms, which can induce only members of a merchant community
to comply, and exhibits separately created law and selected judges. These
very different legal structures result in different qualities of performance.
Their differences involve their respective costs of enforcement, efficacy of
enforcement, and availability of entry. Each of these differences is discussed in turn.
Jewish community networks, which ably enforce executory contracts for diamond sales,
have used “the same family and community relationships” to traffic illegal goods).
35. See Milgrom et al., supra note 15, at 3.
36. These private courts play indispensable roles in disseminating information about
individual reputations. See id. (suggesting that private judges “transmit . . .
information . . . to enable the reputation mechanism to function effectively”); see also
Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1745 (describing private legal system’s reliance upon
the social basis of trade and the flow of reputation related information throughout cotton
industry); Richman, supra note 7, at 19 (stating that the New York Diamond Dealers Club
“facilitate[s] a flow of information about market participants”). They enable reputation
mechanisms to enforce agreements in merchant communities even as the communities
grow. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit
Groups, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, 365 n.31 (2003). Strahilevitz cautions that reputation
mechanisms may weaken when relied upon beyond small communities like those in Shasta
County. Reputation mechanisms, including those that rest upon social norms, can remain
effective, though, when they spread accurate and necessary reputation information.
Cooter and Landa identify a similar drawback to relational contracting, arguing that
personalized trading networks become less advantageous as their size grows, see Cooter &
Landa, supra note 31, at 15–16, but information mechanisms may overcome this as well.
37. Since merchant circles correspond to closely knit communities, many coordinated
sanctions harness social norms that inflict personal disutility. For one example of this
effect, see Richman, supra note 7, at 40–54 (describing coordinated norms among
diamond merchants in Orthodox Jewish community). Some examples of these
coordinated punishments are especially colorful. Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at
128 and Richman, supra note 7, at 20, describe sanctions in the diamond industry that
resemble the Old West’s “Wanted” posters, where the pictures of merchants who are found
to owe debts are posted on the walls of each of the world’s twenty-four diamond bourses.
Once a dealer is known to have a bad debt, he will lose future business, face expulsion
from the diamond bourses, and potentially suffer a denial of religious honors in the UltraOrthodox community. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 128–30. Another
example comes from the fishmongers of Accra, Ghana, where “women greet bad payers on
the main fish market with screams and shouts, thereby sharing information instantly in a
simple but effective fashion. Bad clients find it difficult to remain in the fish business
because they are cut from the major source of supply.” Fafchamps, supra note 18, at 441.
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1. Costs of Enforcement. — The early works by Ellickson and Bernstein
described environments where public courts were available but intentionally shunned, begging an efficiency explanation for how, given particular
circumstances, private law achieved greater efficiencies than public law.
The answers from these early studies and the literature that followed, led
chiefly by Lisa Bernstein’s subsequent work, articulated efficiencies that
resulted from dispute resolution techniques in systems of private law.38
There are three primary sources of efficiencies that private contract
enforcement enjoys over the public court system. First, the private arbitration process exclusively involves industry insiders. The litigating parties are repeat players who are familiar with the arbitration process, the
merchant community, and likely the arbitrators themselves. Such familiarity with the litigation process may reduce the administrative costs for
the parties, but more importantly it maintains realistic expectations of
arbitration results and enhances the predictability of outcomes.39 Of additional significance is the fact that the arbitrators themselves are member merchants who possess industry expertise and specialized knowledge
regarding industry transactions. This expertise makes the private arbitrators well equipped to serve as effective factfinders and positions them to
tailor judgments specifically to match individual disputes. Consequently,
relative to the capacities of public courts, arbitrators issue more factually
accurate rulings and impose remedies more capable of appropriately
punishing behavior. For example, most public courts are very hesitant to
incorporate lost profits into expectation damages because doing so involves speculation that extends beyond the qualifications of judges and
juries.40 One consequence of this refusal is that expectation damages undercompensate the breached party and therefore underdeter breach. Ar38. For a summary of this category of efficiencies and an overview of Lisa Bernstein’s
works, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
39. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 773–74 (1999) (stating that one of
most important functions of merchant-run arbitration tribunals is education of “members
of the trade about the content of the rules and the contours of proper business practices”);
see also Bernstein, Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1815–20 (describing efficiency gains of
merchant adjudication of disputes among grain and feed merchants). Bernstein’s
extremely valuable work on the commercial importance of adjudicative predictability leads
to a fascinating implication: that Karl Llewellyn’s neoclassical approach to contract law—
which is embodied in Article 2 of the UCC—is wrongheaded. Llewellyn’s approach
encourages adjudicators to deduce the originating motives behind a transaction. See, e.g.,
Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 745
(1931) (exhorting courts to look to implied conditions of commercial understanding). In
contrast, by restricting the range of possible interpretations of a certain agreement, and
thus limiting an adjudicator’s ability to second guess contractual intent, commercial law is
able to increase judicial certainty. The predictability of specific litigation encourages
parties to renegotiate and resume commercial dealings outside the courtroom.
40. This is a foundation in the common law and a staple in any first-year contracts
course. See, e.g., Chi. Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 549–50 (App. Ct.
1932).
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bitrators with industry expertise, however, are better positioned to approximate lost profits and routinely award them. Diamond industry
arbitrators not only are able to award lost profits but are instructed to do
so by industry rules.41
Second, private law can be tailored very specifically to the idiosyncratic needs and transactional challenges of a particular industry and can
lead to identifiable efficiencies, including the facilitation of dispute resolution. For example, the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA)
developed clear, bright-line industry contract rules that directly address
problematic issues in grain sales contracts and enable arbitrators to deliver prompt, predictable rulings. Consequently, NGFA rules create contractual certainty where the applicable common law would dictate less
predictable results.42 Similarly, Diamond Dealers Club (DDC) bylaws require several formalities to consummate a diamond sale, including the
invocation of specific words, in order to allow potential buyers to inspect
merchandise while preemptively resolving the looming question of
whether an agreement was formed.43
A third efficiency, drawing on the first two, is that private arbitration
systems are able to act more swiftly and at lower costs than overloaded
and procedure-laden public courts. Private arbitrators enjoy both a familiarity with the industry (including a familiarity with the kinds of disputes
that commonly arise) and specially tailored procedural rules designed
with a greater emphasis on speed than those that govern public courts.
Arbitrators consequently require less background information and struggle with fewer administrative hurdles to deliver rulings.
These three advantages of private law—specialized judges, specialized substantive law, and specialized procedures—lead to faster, more accurate, and more predictable legal outcomes.
2. Efficacy of Enforcement. — Contract law is only as good as the degree to which litigants comply with its rulings. Public courts handle the
challenge of enforcement by providing victorious parties with certain
forceful tools to implement their judgments, including the ability to seize
a losing party’s assets or the ability to impose alternative sanctions such as
jail and other equitable measures. But even these forceful measures are
toothless to enforce certain kinds of agreements. The basic inadequacy
of public courts for these particular agreements reveals a critical additional advantage that some private systems enjoy.
41. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 136 & n.45 (stating that while Diamond
Dealers Club arbitration panels find it extremely difficult to calculate lost profits, they
usually generously award punitive damages to compensate for alleged lost profits).
According to the DDC bylaws, losing parties must also pay an additional fifteen percent of
the arbitration award or $1,500, whichever sum is greater, to compensate the victorious
party for legal expenses. Diamond Dealers Club By-Laws, art. XII, § 12b (1999) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
42. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1739–44.
43. See Diamond Dealers Club By-Laws, supra note 41, at art. XVIII, §§ 1–5.
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Credit purchases for diamonds, for example, are one sort of transaction that public courts simply cannot enforce.44 Diamonds are portable,
concealable, and universally valuable, rendering courts incapable of punishing a merchant who refuses to pay the seller and instead escapes with
the diamonds to an unknown jurisdiction. Moreover, since brokering
diamonds does not require substantial complementary investments, a
fleeing diamond merchant would leave behind few assets for a court to
seize and award to an abandoned seller. Because diamond merchants
need to purchase and sell diamonds on credit,45 merchants require a legal system that can reliably enforce credit agreements.
Public law is incapable of credibly enforcing a second kind of agreement. As discussed above, public law and state courts suffer from substantial delays and often require significant amounts of time to resolve disputes. Consequently, a merchant would not find it economical to employ
the public courts to enforce a contract that involves small dollar amounts
and is time sensitive, leaving courts incapable of credibly enforcing such a
contract.
These are the difficulties confronting America’s fish wholesalers.
Fish supplies are unpredictable, and fish, once caught, spoil quickly. As a
result, wholesalers cannot plan future sales contracts, and once they
purchase fish from boats that arrive into port, they must immediately sell
their goods, often without securing payment or negotiating a secured
contract. One fish dealer commented, “You’re selling a melting ice cube.
Today it’s cod; tomorrow it’s cat food . . . . [We’re] selling things that . . .
drop[ ] in value by the hour. Twenty-eight cents a pound today; it’s
worth two cents a pound tomorrow.”46 The short window of opportunity
to execute a transaction compels sales on credit, but the costliness of enforcing those sales contracts through the public courts precludes effective
ex post enforcement of the credit sales.
Public courts fail in a third instance, where contracts involve complex issues of quality that are difficult either to measure or to verify, particularly when the timeliness of compliance is critical. This is the situation for cotton mills. Mills are most efficient when they are constantly
running, but since cotton involves substantial storage costs, most mills
operate under just-in-time supply networks.47 In addition, to weave the
44. See Richman, supra note 7, at 16 (illustrating the mechanics of diamond credit
transactions). The limited efficacy of public courts plays a critical, yet chiefly
underappreciated, role in provoking the emergence of private law. Both the limited reach
of public courts and certain aspects of contract law can explain why public courts do not
sufficiently deter the inefficient breach of certain contracts.
45. Liquidity constraints and seasonal demand make credit sales central to diamond
merchants. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 118; Richman, supra note 7, at 16.
46. Morning Edition: Maine Man Uses Internet to Sell Credit Information to Fish
Wholesalers (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
47. For an articulation of the contractual hazards in “cheek-by-jowl” transactions,
which arise in just-in-time distribution networks, see Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration
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specified fabrics that their buyers (chiefly clothes manufacturers) demand, mills require particular grades of cotton that are difficult to measure with precision, even by industry experts. Public courts are not well
equipped to determine whether a particular sample of cotton meets the
specifications agreed to by a mill operator and a cotton broker, and they
certainly cannot render decisions within the time constraints required to
keep a mill in operation. This lack of credible enforcement would enable
cheating brokers to shirk on quality or permit cheating mills to avoid
payment by claiming that quality specifications were not met.
Private legal systems, resting on reputation mechanisms, have provided instruments that rescued each of these industries from the inadequacies of the public courts, and their successes illustrate how private ordering employs enforcement tools unavailable to public courts. Public
courts are largely constrained by contract law to impose remedial awards
only equal to the damage done by the breaching party,48 which, under
the circumstances described above, are inadequate to credibly induce
compliance. When a merchant’s success is predicated on a good reputation, however, the entirety of future dealings is at stake. Systems that organize a coordinated punishment—for example, the internet company
Seafax49 publicizes fish buyers who have not yet paid wholesalers,50 to
whom wholesalers subsequently will not sell—will credibly threaten the
obligor with severe and easily administered sanctions, thus inducing
compliance.
In addition, reputation mechanisms have the capacity to reach into
noneconomic concerns to compel merchants to adhere to their contractual obligations. One could call this the “orthogonality principle,” where
a merchant’s utility is a function not just of economic profits but also of
other concerns that fall under a trading network’s control, such as community honor or participation in community events.51 For example, cotand Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 33, 38–39, 46–48 (1985).
48. There are, of course, some exceptions, such as punitive damages allowed by
statute. One popular example is Massachusetts’s commercial laws requiring good faith
dealing. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93A, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2004). Violators of
Chapter 93A are subject to multiple damages, attorneys’ fees, and other costs. Id. at § 9.
49. Interested readers can visit the website at http://www.seafax.com.
50. See SEAFAX Products and Services (last visited Oct. 3, 2004), at http://www.
seafax.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/Seafax.woa/wa/gotoDocument?title=seafaxproductsand
services&zsection=about&zsubsection=none (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing available Seafax services).
51. Some sophisticated utility models can characterize this principle, where
individuals crave both economic and community goods. See Laurence R. Iannaccone,
Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives,
100 J. Pol. Econ. 271, 276–83 (1992). For a useful illustration of how this innovative
characterization of individual utilities can explain unusual economic and social behavior,
see Eli Berman, Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist’s View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews,
115 Q.J. Econ. 905, 921–29 (2000). Galanter similarly observes that intimate communities
hold leverage over their members that state courts do not, noting that “[c]ommunity
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ton mill operators and cotton brokers enjoy membership in an intimate
society that organizes social events, wives clubs, debutante balls, and
other institutionalized occasions where merchants crave recognition and
participation. A reputation marked by nonpayment or delivery of poor
quality will interfere with one’s—and one’s family’s—social status and
welcome at these events.52 More forcefully, the Ultra-Orthodox Jews who
dominate New York’s diamond industry crave participation in their communities’ intimate religious rituals, celebrations, and life-cycle events.
Cheating on contractual obligations leads to exclusion from community
religious practices, and flight from the community—which is the primary
hazard in diamond credit sales—cuts off all possible religious participation.53 In both merchant communities, a merchant’s dependence on his
community’s resources drives his ultimate compliance with the industry’s
norms and private rulings. These examples of the orthogonality principle may explain the tendency to see ethnically homogeneous merchants
associated with trading networks governed by private law. In individual
ethnic groups, social and community networks, in addition to the
merchants themselves, can coordinate punishments and induce behavior
by touching sectors of a merchant’s life that public courts cannot reach.
One reason the orthogonality of preferences is important in private
law settings is that, otherwise, private law systems might be susceptible to
an endgame problem. Where cooperation is induced by the prospects of
future transactions, incentives are measurably diluted as merchants approach retirement. One response to the endgame problem is to allow
merchants to bequeath their reputations to their descendants who remain in the industry. This is nearly universal in the diamond industry,
where essentially all merchants have children or nephews who inherit the
family business (and, moreover, no other avenue really is available for
new diamond merchants to enter the industry).54 The same occurs in the
cotton industry, which observes significant intergenerational transfers of
family businesses and the associated reputations.55 Not all cotton
merchants, however, eventually bequeath their businesses. In these instances their desires to maintain a respected status in the community
compel honest behavior through their last transaction. Targeting orthogonal preferences is a useful strategy to induce contractual compliance
and resolve a reputation system’s endgame problem.
3. Availability of Entry. — A significant shortcoming to private law,
noted above, is that it can only reach those who subscribe to it—reputastanding, seniority, reputation for integrity or formidability may confer capability in the
indigenous setting that does not translate into capability in the official setting.” Galanter,
supra note 4, at 24. Similar themes are discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779, 782–85 (1994).
52. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1745–54.
53. See Richman, supra note 7, at 38–53 (using a “club good” model to explain the
motivations of diamond dealers).
54. See id. at 31–32.
55. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1770.
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tion mechanisms can only police those who place value in maintaining a
good reputation.56 Thus, the reach of private law is limited to long-term
players who are assured of, and who plan to pursue, a long horizon of
transactions.
This leads to a critical limitation to private ordering: Reputationbased private enforcement erects sizable entry barriers.57 Because only
participating long-term players have incentives to cooperate, newcomers
who have not yet established a good reputation are unable to commit
credibly to uphold their contractual promises. Thus, McMillan and
Woodruff noted, “[t]he corollary of ongoing relationships is a reluctance
to deal with firms outside the relationship.”58 Even an honest merchant
who has yet to demonstrate a good reputation will not be able to transact
with other merchants. Merchants who want to transact with cotton mills
and brokers must undergo a rigorous application process before acquiring sufficient trust to enter independently into transactions.59 The diamond industry’s networks erect even stiffer entry barriers, essentially permitting only Ultra-Orthodox community members or relatives of current
merchants into the trading networks.60 Moreover, these networks tend to
be rather unforgiving. A merchant found to have previously missed a
payment must endure significant hurdles before gaining reentrance into
the trading communities.
Some networks, such as the fish wholesalers, do seem to allow entry,
but in doing so they assume a different cost. Networks that open themselves to unknown merchants, assuming honesty until proven otherwise,
expose themselves to cheaters, who will always be able to enter and cheat
once without facing sanctions. Some relational contract networks address
this problem by employing public courts to complement private order56. Galanter deserves credit for observing this. After noting that “indigenous
communities” enjoy powers over some transactors that are unavailable to public courts, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text, he writes, “the indigenous tribunal faces the problem
of obtaining leverage over those who are impervious to community opinion, getting them
to submit to its jurisdiction or to comply with its decisions.” Galanter, supra note 4, at 26;
see also Greif, Impersonal Exchange, supra note 21, at 35 (suggesting that key power of
public courts is ability to police all parties).
57. Entry barriers serve to limit the threat of superior competitors. Potential entrants
can introduce new technologies, which can either lower costs (and thus prices) or improve
quality. Restricting entry, therefore, shelters inefficient incumbents. In short, restricting
entry can elevate prices or suppress quality improvements. For a discussion of the costs of
entry barriers, see Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 305–55 (1988).
Despite the importance of entry barriers in industrial organization economics, a consensus
definition and understanding has remained elusive. For a brief overview of alternative
definitions through history and a useful classification of entry barriers, see R. Preston
McAfee et al., What Is a Barrier to Entry?, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 461, 461–65 (2004).
58. McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2454.
Though the relevant study—and thus this reference—is to firms, the same of course
applies to individual merchants.
59. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1765 n.167.
60. See Richman, supra note 7, at 26 (noting that “nearly all [diamond merchants in
New York] . . . were brought into the diamond trade by close relatives”).
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ing, even though the cost of employing the public courts may exceed the
potential recovery.61 Thus, open networks may enjoy lower entry barriers
but assume certain corresponding costs of one-time cheaters.
Another cost associated with the relational contracting and reputation mechanisms that support private ordering is the potential for collusive behavior. Since trade in a private system occurs within a closed community comprised of traders who are linked by channels of information
and communication, merchants are well positioned to collude on price
or collectively deny competitive entrants access to supply networks and
other necessary resources. Of course, as the number of merchants increases, coordination becomes more difficult and collusive behavior becomes less likely.62 Consequently, collusion is unlikely to be a problem in
the trading networks discussed here, where large numbers of intermediaries comprise the distribution system. Although there have been
antitrust challenges to certain merchant networks, including one initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice against the New York Diamond
Dealers Club,63 the failure of those suits and the persistence of self-enforcement in the trading networks suggest that the dangers of inefficient
collusion are slim.
In sum, systems of private ordering enjoy an assortment of administrative efficiencies over the public courts, including savings in arriving at
and implementing accurate adjudications. Private ordering can also secure some contracts in cases where public courts would be toothless.
61. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2436
n.52, 2453–54. Eastern Europe’s costly and inefficient public court system may serve as a
supervising authority to reputation networks, thus explaining why both public courts and
reputation mechanisms are simultaneously employed in that region.
Another method of managing an open system is to screen new merchants and
evaluate their unknown reputations and commercial intentions through other available
information before entering into transactions. Seafax, for example, compiles credit
records and other publicly available financial data on prospective buyers, in addition to
their payment histories, to help sellers decide with whom they will transact. See supra note
49 and accompanying text. Some similar information is made available to subscribing
diamond merchants by the Rapaport Group, which publishes the Rapaport Diamond
Report and other newsletters. Interested readers can visit the website at http://www.
diamonds.net. However, gathering such information on unfamiliar individuals can be
costly and time consuming, and thus that strategy is not always pursued. See Fafchamps,
supra note 18, at 441–42 (describing how only a minority of businesses in Ghana “actively
screen prospective trade credit recipients,” whether by simple methods like inspecting the
client’s work place or more time-consuming methods of asking banks to perform informal
credit checks).
62. This proposition is at the heart of Joe Bain’s original concern with market
concentration, which drove much of his era’s industrial organization literature. See
Joseph Bain, Barriers to New Competition 27–29 (1965); see also Tirole, supra note 57, at
chap. 6.
63. See Alfred J. Lubin, Diamond Dealers Club: A Fifty Year History 14 (1976)
(describing antitrust actions against the Club in the aftermath of World War II, which
ultimately led to only a minimal fine).
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There are, however, corresponding costs to employing private ordering,
including restricting entry and (to a lesser extent) inviting collusion.64
B. Firms Versus Markets
In transaction cost economics, the paradigmatic issue is the “makeor-buy” question (alternatively coined the question of vertical integration), which asks whether a particular transaction will occur inside or
outside the parameters of a firm. The inquiry begins by articulating the
structural attributes of firms, markets, and other alternative forms of economic organization—where each enjoys strengths, for which transactions
each structure is well suited, and what inherent tradeoffs are involved in
an economic actor’s selection of one form over another.65
It is critical to note at the outset that there is some significant overlap
between the literature’s comparison of firms and arms-length market
transactions and the above discussion comparing public and private law.
Many of the cost savings that private law enjoys over public law are also
enjoyed by firms. Firms can secure hazardous transactions that contract
64. McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, passim, also
discuss noneconomic costs associated with relational contracting, such as bigotry and
persistent discrimination. Richard McAdams employs game theory to illustrate how trustbased relational transactions can fuel bigotry and cause both economic and noneconomic
costs. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1029–33 (1995). George
Akerlof presents useful models explaining how customary forms of discrimination lead to
adverse economic consequences. George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which
Unemployment May Be One Consequence, 94 Q.J. Econ. 749, 750–53 (1980); George A.
Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages among Tradition-Oriented Stochastically
Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 265, 272–75 (1985).
For an alternative perspective on the effect of entry barriers on private legal systems,
see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1688–89 (1996)
[hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law] (articulating some potential benefits to a
decentralized system of law, where courts find locally optimal rules by enforcing locally
developed norms). Where entry barriers to merchant communities prompt the creation of
additional communities with competing norms, Professor Cooter’s analysis suggests that
such barriers may have beneficial consequences. Id. at 1688–89.
Private legal systems that rely on social norms for enforcement and substantive law run
the risk of an additional cost: the possibility that they have selected inefficient norms. Eric
Posner suggests that such a possibility is not insignificant. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics,
and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1698 (1996). Alan Schwartz and Robert
Scott warn more specifically that private legal systems are likely to succumb to powerful
interest groups and employ rules that are favorable to those private interests but are
socially unfavorable. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 624–37, 644–45 (1995).
65. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and
Antitrust Implications (1975) (analyzing powers and limits of market organization and
hierarchical organization); Williamson, EIC, supra note 8. For a review of the widespread
applications of the transaction cost approach, see Shelanski & Klein, supra note 8, at
341–50 (1995); see also Boerner & Macher, supra note 8, at 10–35 (reviewing transaction
cost economics literature).
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law or unrestricted markets cannot guarantee and thus provide the transactional assurance that, as McMillan and Woodruff properly noted, is so
craved by businesspeople.66 Moreover, firms develop personnel with the
same industry expertise that private legal systems find so useful in adjudicating disputes; firms implement specialized rules to organize their internal transactions and routines to address their particularized economic
objectives; and firms can operate by fiat, thus implementing decisions
with speed and without external procedural barriers.67 Consequently,
the features the private ordering literature identifies when extolling the
virtues of private legal systems—transactional security, expertise, tailored
rules, and speed—are all exhibited by firms.
This similarity reveals one of the most glaring problems of the legalcentric private ordering literature. When informed by the theory of the
firm, the catalogued benefits of private over public ordering are insufficient to explain a rejection of public courts. Since a firm can achieve
many of the same efficiencies that private legal systems enjoy, why do
certain industries nonetheless rely on private ordering instead of organizing themselves within vertically integrated firms? The answer lies in the
reciprocal cornerstone of transaction cost theory: The chief advantage
market-based organization enjoys over internalizing transactions inside a
firm is the market’s capacity to maintain high-powered incentives, a consideration that has been conspicuously left out of the private ordering
literature.
Understanding the role of incentives involves an application of rudimentary institutional economics. According to transaction cost theory,
firms enjoy strong administrative controls, but they also dilute market incentives and filter market information. Because of this dilution and filtration, agents acting inside a firm are less sensitive and responsive to
changes in price or demand than are corresponding autonomous
agents.68 Market actors, more than firm actors, have greater exposure to
market information and greater incentives to collect and then promptly
act on relevant information. This feature of markets, which supplies an
important comparative advantage over hierarchies, has been described by
Friederich Hayek and Oliver Williamson as “spontaneous governance,”69
where incentives are in place “to provide inducements which will make
66. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dysfunctional Public Order, supra note 1, at 2421.
67. For a detailed articulation of the transactional benefits of firms, see Williamson,
MOG, supra note 10, at ch. 4; Williamson, EIC, supra note 8, at chs. 3–4. Many of the
organizational benefits of firms discussed here are similarly identified in W. Richard Scott,
Organizations (3d ed. 1992) and the classic Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the
Executive (18th ed. 1968).
68. Oliver Williamson attributes a firm’s incapacity to mimic market incentives to “the
impossibility of selective intervention” on the part of managers and the “Fundamental
Transformation,” in which nonspecific relationships acquire specificity when internalized
within the firm. Williamson, MOG, supra note 10, at 49–50. For a detailed discussion of
the costs of bureaucracy, see Williamson, EIC, supra note 8, at ch. 6.
69. Williamson, EIC, supra note 8, at 125.
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the individuals do the desirable things without anyone having to tell them
what to do.”70 Consequently, internalizing a transaction inside a firm involves trading high-powered incentives and the capacity for spontaneous
adjustment for transactional assurance. Transactions where agreements
are particularly difficult to secure are more likely to occur inside firms,
but transactions that present fewer enforcement difficulties are more efficiently organized in markets where information is freely disseminated
and high-powered incentives are not diluted.71
In sum, transaction cost theory reveals the advantage that private ordering enjoys over firms: While both private ordering and firms are capable of providing greater transactional assurance than public courts, private ordering systems operate with autonomous economic agents and,
unlike firms, neither dilute market incentives nor filter market information. On the other hand, the corresponding costs of private law are the
entry barriers associated with reputation mechanisms, which firm-based
exchange does not erect. So, within the structural comparison between
private law and firms lies the tradeoff of diluted incentives versus entry
barriers.
C. Summary
Incorporating the principles discussed in this Part into a single analysis is fairly straightforward. First, the private ordering literature and
transaction cost theory detail several advantages that both private ordering
and vertically integrated firms enjoy over arms-length transactions that
are enforced in state courts: greater transactional assurance, expert adjudication, and expedient dispute resolution. Second, the private ordering
literature observes that merchant communities that rely on self-enforcement must assume the costs of entry barriers, which is a cost that does not
hinder industries relying either on vertical integration or the public
courts. And third, the benefits of high-powered incentives that market
organization enjoys over firm-based organization reflect the advantages of
exchange between autonomous agents, whether within private ordering
systems or public courts, over exchange within the integrated firm. The
lessons from this Part are summarized in Figure 1.
70. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 527 (1945).
Hayek, in emphasizing the economic centrality of information, emphasized that the
solution requires a minimization of hierarchical control:
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid
adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would
seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are
familiar with these circumstances . . . . We must solve it by some form of
decentralization.
Id. at 524; see also Williamson, MOG, supra note 10, at ch. 6.
71. In part because transaction cost economics generates such parsimonious
hypotheses, its empirical applications are widespread. See Shelanski & Klein, supra note 8,
at 335–36; Boerner & Macher, supra note 8, at 11–35.
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FIGURE 1—INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
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Importantly, Figure 1 contains some refutable hypotheses and assists
in developing a positive theory of private law. The model predicts that
private ordering is comparatively superior to firms and public ordering
for industries that confront difficult-to-enforce transactions, are particularly sensitive to high-powered incentives, and do not prohibitively suffer
when entry is limited.
III. A TEST

WITH

PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE

The most straightforward test of Figure 1 is to determine whether its
hypotheses comport with the findings of the budding private ordering
literature. Unfortunately, as was noted in Part I, much of the private law
literature examines systems in institutional settings where public courts
are not an available option. But some systems of private law do emerge in
settings where contract law is available, thereby providing material for a
preliminary test.72 This Part continues to pay particular attention to two
merchant communities that have appeared throughout this Essay—New
York’s diamond merchants and Memphis’s cotton brokers. It then relates
the model to a category of trading networks that employs private ordering to organize brokerage activities. The structural similarities underlying the privately governed merchant communities suggest some robustness to the model.
A. Diamonds
The enigmatic diamond industry has systematically rejected public
courts and instead polices its merchants through private ordering and
nonlegal sanctions.73 Consistent with the model, the industry’s arrival at
private ordering is explained by the difficulty of enforcing diamond
72. Of course, collecting empirical material from previous studies likely suffers from a
self-selection problem. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32. For that and other
reasons, the empirical test conducted here can serve illustrative purposes only.
73. The diamond industry is the beneficiary of three in-depth studies: Bernstein,
Diamonds, supra note 5; Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block
Booking, 26 J.L. & Econ 497 (1983); and Richman, supra note 7. These three works serve
as the foundation for this Part. Additionally, Yoram Barzel offered earlier examinations in
Yoram Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & Econ.
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credit sales, the particular importance of high-powered market incentives, and the relatively low costs of entry barriers.
First, the diamond sale is an extreme instance of a hazardous transaction. Merchants can valuably expand their inventory if they make
purchases on credit, so sales are predominantly implemented by executory contracts in which a buyer takes possession of a valuable cache of
diamonds before making payment. In addition, a similar separation between possession and ownership results from the industry’s significant
utilization of brokers, who aggressively market diamonds they do not own
to assorted buyers.74 However, diamonds’ portability, concealability, and
universally precious value make the risk of theft acutely high and extremely costly, leading the industry to develop forceful private mechanisms to induce credit payment and deter theft. Entry is permitted only
to members of intergenerational firms, who expect they will bequeath
their family business to their descendants, and to Ultra-Orthodox Jews,75
who depend on community religious goods in addition to market commodities. Those who are permitted to participate in the industry are
therefore subject to a rigorous reputation mechanism, in which bad actors and their descendants are proscribed from future transactions and
denied participation in community religious activities. The threat of
these indefinite and noneconomic sanctions is sufficient to induce contractual compliance and transactional security.
Second, adding value in diamond sales is a process that is largely
dependent on collecting market information, exposure to market pressures, and the capacity for spontaneous adaptation. The broad assortment of possible cuts, polishing techniques, jewelry settings, and subjective judgments infuses substantial variation and uncertainty into how end
consumers will value a given diamond. This subjective valuation means
that finding an optimal buyer for a specific stone is a very profitable enterprise. However, a buyer needs to examine a diamond personally and
carefully in order to arrive at a personal valuation, so executing sales requires searching for prospective buyers and bringing diamonds to them
for inspection. This matching process—the search for the “right”
buyer—is very sensitive to effort. Sellers and brokers must gather market
information regarding buyer demand and pair their idiosyncratic needs
with the distinct qualities of available stones. In fact, the trading floor of
the Diamond Dealers Club reveals a sea of high-powered incentives,
where brokers invest substantial effort in determining what a prospective
291, 304–05 (1977) and Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of
Markets, 25 J.L. & Econ. 27, 32 (1982).
74. For illustrations of the importance of time-inconsistent exchange in certain
industries, see supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
75. New York’s diamond industry relies predominantly on Ultra-Orthodox Jews, but
other homogeneous, insular ethnic communities that exhibit similar features also play
important roles in the global industry. See Richman, supra note 7, at Part IV.
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buyer needs and convincing that buyer to examine available diamonds.
Fervor, intensity, and zeal characterize the DDC’s swirl of trading activity.
The costs of bureaucracy and the benefits of the diamond industry’s
market-based organization are immediately evident from the typical instance of a potential diamond buyer announcing a need to purchase
stones of certain characteristics. Since buyers overwhelmingly require
that they be allowed to personally inspect a stone before committing to a
purchase, the sale will go to the first seller who can present the buyer with
an adequate diamond. Diamond sellers are best able to respond to this
necessity for spontaneous adaptation when they are either principals in
family-run businesses or self-employed brokers of those family businessmen—parties who are in possession of stones for purchase and have authority to execute a sale swiftly. A large firm whose salespersons would
need to report a sales opportunity to an executive and then obtain the
executive’s authorization for the sale would get beaten by the swifter competition. Moreover, since the DDC serves as a central bazaar for diamond
sales, few benefits come from employing large sales forces. While most
competitive industries place a premium on agility, the nature of diamond
sales—where demand is idiosyncratic and difficult to codify, merchandise
requires in-person inspection, and goods are easily portable and extremely valuable—leads to unusually large efficiencies from spontaneous
adaptation. These efficiencies induce market-based organization.
Lastly, the diamond industry does exhibit entry barriers, with participation in the industry sharply limited (with nearly no exceptions)76 to
family members of current merchants and to members of ethnically homogeneous communities, particularly Ultra-Orthodox Jews. However,
the costs of limiting entry are relatively small.
First, the numbers of merchants in various diamond centers approach levels where collusion or coordination would be difficult, even
with the assorted community connections that members share. The New
York Diamond Dealers Club, for example, is home to two thousand
members.
Second, technological innovation has played a relatively small role in
the industry’s history. Diamond cutting employs essentially the same
processes—manually applying a stone to a grinding wheel—that sixteenth century cutters used. Modern, large-scale techniques to polish
diamonds have only been successful for very small stones that do not
command significant values, thereby not really infringing on the Diamond Dealers’ core market. Moreover, the process of selling a diamond
has always required in-person inspection and sales, preventing any marketing economies of scale. Certification and grading by the Gemological
Institute of America (GIA) and other grading organizations can suggest a

76. See id. at 26 n.53.
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stone’s value, but these processes still leave room for substantial variation,
forcing buyers to continue resorting to in-person purchases.77
Third, and perhaps most importantly, entry into the diamond industry is limited for only one particular channel of distribution, as the path
from mine to jewelry manufacturer need not pass through the DDC’s Jewish merchants. The distribution attempts by internet marketers reveal
that entry, in fact, is not limited for those who want to distribute
diamonds through alternative channels. Additionally, the industry has
witnessed entry by ethnic groups who have been able to mimic or adopt
the private ordering mechanisms employed by Jewish merchants.78 But
the continued predominance—over several centuries—of Jewish and ethnic networks suggests that the survival of those networks is a function of
their superiority over, not their insulation from, market challengers.
In sum, the diamond industry requires unusually forceful contractual enforcement, benefits significantly from high-powered market incentives and free access to market information, and does not suffer significantly from entry barriers.
B. Cotton
America’s cotton industry also polices its own merchants.79 Most
merchant-to-mill transactions are governed by the Southern Mill Rules,
which are adopted and administered by trade associations that represent
both merchants and mills. Merchant-to-merchant transactions are chiefly
governed by the rules of the Memphis Cotton Exchange or one of four
regional cotton shippers’ associations. These rules, however, merely provide a framework for a reputation mechanism, where arbitration panels
determine and publicize the identities of parties who breach their agreements. Wrongdoers are then rejected as members of the merchant associations, thus precluding them from future industry business, and subjecting them to nonlegal sanctions that include social ostracism from
Memphis’s Old South community.
Like the diamond industry, the cotton industry employs transactions
that are difficult to enforce and that rely on high-powered incentives, and
its brokerage system imposes relatively low costs from entry barriers. Cotton mills operate best when they are in continual operation, and so mill
operators rely on a steady influx of cotton. However, since cotton is
costly to store, mill operators supervise a just-in-time, or cheek-by-jowl,
system of supply contracts where new quantities of cotton are scheduled
77. See Russell Shor, Diamond Grading Reports: Flawless or Imperfect?, Jewelers’
Circular Keystone, July 1995, available at http://www.gemology.ru/cut/english/diamgrad.
htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that “[i]t’s no trade secret that
diamonds can get different grading reports or ‘certificates’ from different labs—or even
the same lab”).
78. See Richman, supra note 7, at Part V.
79. This Part relies predominantly on Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5.

R
R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\104-8\COL805.txt

2004]

unknown

Seq: 28

6-DEC-04

THEORY OF PRIVATE ORDERING

12:15

2355

to arrive just as the previous shipment is depleted.80 In addition, cotton
mills, depending on their customer orders, require very particular grades
and qualities of cotton that are difficult to predict in advance. While
previewing samples may be helpful, buyers are generally required to rely
on the characterizations they receive from merchants. A late shipment or
a shipment of the wrong quantity, grade, or quality can be extremely
costly to the mill operator, making precise contractual compliance extremely important.
Classic transaction cost theory would predict that the dangers of noncompliance would induce vertical integration, where cotton mills would
integrate backwards and employ their own army of merchants.81 Such a
strategy, however, would sacrifice some incentive intensity for contract
security. Like the diamond industry, a cotton broker’s effectiveness is
very sensitive to effort. The supply chain for cotton mills involves a
matching process, much like searching for the optimal diamond buyer,
where brokers search for specific kinds of cotton to meet a mill’s particularized needs. Brokers need to gather market information to discover
buyers’ needs and determine which sources can meet those needs. Vertical integration dilutes the incentives to gather and execute on such market information, and transaction cost theory suggests that such a dilution
would produce a significant loss in efficiency.
Also like the diamond industry, the cotton brokerage system would
benefit little from the infusion of new brokers. The large number of current brokers would have a difficult time colluding. Additionally, the
buyer-seller matching process does not suffer from logjams or technological backwardness, which normally are the market inefficiencies that
tempt new entrants. Moreover, the real benefits from entry would come
from competition from alternative distribution systems, not alternative
distributors—systems against which the private ordering system does not
erect any barriers. Like diamonds, cotton grading requires in-person inspection, so buyers will either have to evaluate their own purchases or
continue to trust the reputations of those from whom they buy.
C. Global Middlemen: California’s Mexican Merchants, Eleventh-Century
Maghribi Traders, and Malaysia’s Chinese Networks
The structures of the diamond and cotton industries are strikingly
similar. In addition to relying on similar kinds of transactions, where the
costs of contract breach are unusually high, both industries rely on a brokerage system to gather market information and execute value-creating
80. See Joskow, supra note 47, at 38 (explaining cheek-by-jowl system and its value).
81. Another vertical integration option would be for mills to own their sources of
cotton. However, since mills require a specific cotton grade to fulfill each customer order,
they would need access to a broad collection of cotton sources to meet varying demand. A
cotton mill pursuing vertical integration would have to own and maintain access to a large
and diverse supply of cotton, which would be commercially infeasible given cotton’s high
storage costs.
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matches between buyers and sellers. This matching system is an interestingly common feature in the private ordering literature. Karen Clay’s examination of California’s Mexican merchants living in the 1830s and
1840s uncovers a system where Mexican middlemen structured a nexus of
trade in a remote frontier for distant merchants.82 Using a reputation
mechanism to police their colleagues, the Mexican intermediaries
brokered purchases and sales for ships that brought goods from Boston,
Mexico, the Hawaiian Islands, and South America. Similarly, Avner
Greif’s seminal work on the eleventh-century Maghribi traders uncovers a
system of intermediaries in which the Maghribis used their cross-Mediterranean connections with each other to broker sales of goods to distant
markets.83 Lastly, Janet Landa’s exploration into the commercial networks in Southeast Asia uncovers ethnic communities of intermediaries
who facilitate transactions for distant traders.84 These traders rely on reputation mechanisms and community sanctions to ensure that their members resist the significant temptation to steal the goods they are
brokering.
The model developed here can explain the predominance of brokerage systems, or middlemen, in the private ordering literature. Economic
actors in these systems create value by gathering market information so as
to match optimally available goods with buyers’ demands. Their value
creation is driven by the efficient dissemination and collection of information, a process best organized within a market structure and one that
is very sensitive to effort. In addition, the duties of an intermediary typically include taking possession of valuable goods that one does not own,
which in turn creates substantial transactional hazards for their counterparts. This problem is partially solved by the middlemen’s repeat participation and embeddedness in the merchant community, which support a
reputation-based private ordering system that enforces contractual compliance. And even though their systems of private enforcement erect barriers to others who would otherwise serve as brokers, their merchant community suffers few costs from restricting entry so long as a critical mass of
merchants remains. The model suggests that these are the merchant
communities that are most likely to employ private ordering to enforce
agreements.
The similarities among these different merchant networks lend additional support to Landa’s broad “Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman
Group” theory, which describes how ethnic groups can operate distribu82. Clay, supra note 17, at 202–03.
83. Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 13, at 535–42; Greif, Reputation and
Coalitions, supra note 13, at 858–59.
84. Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349, 349–51 (1981) [hereinafter
Landa, Middleman]. See generally Janet T. Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity (1994)
(providing “a unifying theoretical framework to explain such diverse exchange institutions
as contract law, ethnic trading networks, and gift-exchange”).
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tion networks at lower transaction costs than less homogeneous groups.85
One important element that is surprisingly missing from Landa’s theory,
however, is an explanation for why these ethnic networks assume the
roles of middlemen—brokers who create value through a process of
matching a buyer with a seller—rather than other roles in the economy.
The model described here fills that hole. The matching process in brokerage systems presents severe transactional hazards, but it relies on the
incentive intensities and information availability that typify market organization. Consequently, an ethnic group’s capacity to self-enforce contracts is put to optimal use when group members act as intermediaries.
In short, ethnic networks excel at providing brokerage systems for the
same reason that the diamond and cotton industries have turned to private ordering.
D. Social Norms and Professional Norms
In Order Without Law, Robert Ellickson articulated “A Hypothesis of
Welfare-Maximizing Norms,” which argued that “members of a tight-knit
group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the
aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one
another.”86 Ellickson argued that these norms maintain a system of social
control similar to how contracts enable a promisee to induce certain behavior from a promisor, where the substantive norms that emerge are
those that bring mutual gain to all community members.87 Why, then,
did the residents of Shasta County employ social norms and private ordering (or, in Ellickson’s vocabulary, self-help) to maximize their social
welfare rather than entering into a multilateral contract, enforceable by
the public courts? The immediate answer is that the coordination, negotiation, and administrative costs necessary to form such a contract would
be prohibitive compared to the individual gains from the maximizing
norms. This explanation evaporates, though, if a social norm is viewed as
the product of an implicit multilateral contract—after all, a norm is effective only if it is supported by a collective commitment. Viewing Shasta
County norms through “the lens of contract”88 reveals how the implications from this Essay apply to a larger set of social and professional
norms.
85. Landa, Middleman, supra note 84, at 359–61.
86. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 167 (emphasis omitted). Ellickson notes that many
earlier scholars, from varying disciplines, advanced similar propositions. See id. at 167 n.1.
87. Id. at 123–36.
88. Oliver E. Williamson, The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering, 92 Am. Econ. Rev.
Papers & Proc. 438, 438 (2002) (observing that “mutuality of advantage from voluntary
exchange is . . . the most fundamental of all understandings in economics . . . [and] is
better realized by examining economics through the lens of contract rather than the lens
of choice” (citing James M. Buchanan, A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic
Theory, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 225 (1975))).
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A wealth-maximizing norm essentially is a tacit agreement to engage
in mutually beneficial wealth-maximizing behavior—an implicit quid pro
quo.89 The difference between wealth-maximizing norms and wealthmaximizing contracts90 lies not in the substance of the underlying agreements (since both outline the contours of maximizing behavior) but instead lies in how the agreements are enforced—contracts are traditionally
enforced by courts, whereas norms are policed by self-enforced social
sanctions. Accordingly, a tight-knit community’s use of private ordering
parallels a merchant community’s development of a private legal system
with privately enforced sanctions.
Consistent with the predictions of the model described in Part II,
Shasta County’s91 use of self-enforced norms—instead of publicly enforced law or vertical integration—is driven by the reduced costs and reliable efficacy of private enforcement, the relative insignificance of entry
barriers, and the role of incentives. First, Shasta residents’ use of social
sanctions to punish defectors, chiefly through the dissemination of truthful negative gossip, avoids the very significant costs of litigation. In addition, residents understand that future interactions with their neighbors
will offer opportunities to reciprocate accidental harms (i.e., your cattle
graze on my pasture today, and mine will likely graze on yours tomorrow), thereby enabling them to avoid conflicts altogether.92 Thus,
gossip and mental accounting serve as inexpensive enforcement devices
that remain highly effective because neighbors strongly desire to main89. Implicit quid pro quos can alternatively be described as iterated prisoner’s
dilemma problems, where a collective commitment to a tit-for-tat strategy—in which
cooperative behavior is rewarded with reciprocal cooperation while defection is threatened
with sanctions—will sustain mutually welfare-maximizing behavior. See generally Robert
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 206–07 (1984).
Most of the economics and philosophy literature define norms as obligations to
engage in certain behavior, subject to the threat of sanctions. See, e.g., Cooter, Structural
Adjudication, supra note 4, at 229 n.28 (describing the canonical form of a norm as “an
obligation (norm’s character) to do something (norm’s act) in certain circumstances
(norm’s conditions), subject to a penalty for noncompliance (norm’s sanction)” (citing
Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry passim (1963))). Perhaps
norms differ from contracts in that contracts are products of explicit agreements whereas
norms are internalized, see id. at 220–21, but even that difference is immaterial if the
distinction between explicit and implicit agreements is blurred. More importantly, the
explicitness of contract formation does not determine either the substance of the
underlying agreements or the instruments through which those agreements are enforced.
90. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott articulate a normative theory suggesting that
contracts between commercial agents should be viewed as wealth-maximizing endeavors,
and contract law should interpret them accordingly. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541, 544 (2003)
(“[C]ontract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint
gains (the ‘contractual surplus’) from transactions.”). Understanding norms as implicit
multilateral contracts might suggest that the applicability of Schwartz and Scott’s theory
extends into the study of norms as well.
91. Though this discussion pertains to Ellickson’s description of Shasta County, the
conclusions can be generalized to other close-knit communities.
92. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 55–62; see also supra note 89.
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tain positive long-term relations with each other and their community.93
Second, and relatedly, the costs of entry barriers from relying on private
ordering are insignificant since the community population remains
largely stable. And third, ownership of land by individual families, rather
than integrated ownership, strengthens market incentives on property
owners. Though perhaps absurd to consider in the context of Shasta
County, vertical integration would place the whole county under a single
owner, and residents would rent under leases that define renters’ rights.
Such a rental scheme would preemptively resolve neighborly disputes,
but the bureaucratic costs of centralized ownership would dilute much of
the land’s value.
The model can be similarly applied to professional communities that
disseminate professional, mutually wealth-enhancing norms of conduct.
One such community that has benefited from valuable examination is
Silicon Valley’s engineers. In Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition
in Silicon Valley and Route 128, AnnaLee Saxenian observed that Silicon
Valley engineers developed professional norms that emphasize sharing
information, cooperating with competitors, and building collegial relationships through social and professional networks.94 Even though research-intensive firms are normally inclined to resist openness in order to
protect their intellectual property, engineers refused to work for firms
that were not committed to these collaborative norms—such as firms that
punished employees for sharing firm information with outsiders, aggressively protected intellectual property rights through litigation, or restricted employees’ ability to pursue outside opportunities. This professional ordering prevented noncooperating firms from remaining
competitive. In addition, executives and employees at noncooperating
firms were excluded from professional networks and many social networks, making work at those firms additionally undesirable. Saxenian argues that the California engineers’ professional norms led both to their
collective benefit and to the region’s tremendous economic growth.95
93. Importantly, the efficacy of self-enforcement is contingent on the certainty of a
long horizon of future interactions, and Ellickson explicitly observes that residents
resorted to formal litigation in public courts when one of the parties was not embedded
and socially invested in the community. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 62–64.
94. AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon
Valley and Route 128, at 30 (1994). Alan Hyde similarly observes that engineering firms
that sue departing employees for violating covenants not to compete or trade secret
agreements suffer reputational damage, have difficulty recruiting new employees, and
experience diminished internal morale. See Alan Hyde, Working in Silicon Valley:
Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market 40 (2003) [hereinafter
Hyde, Trade Secrets] (concluding that trade secret suits against departing employees harm
plaintiff companies in various ways while “rarely accomplish[ing] anything”); Alan Hyde,
Silicon Valley’s High-Velocity Labor Market: When Labor Markets Work Like Information
Markets, 11 Bank Am. J. Applied Corp. Fin. 28, 32 (1998) (highlighting such damages in
the case of Intel).
95. See Saxenian, supra note 94, at 30. But see Hyde, Trade Secrets, supra note 94, at
33 (attributing, in part, Silicon Valley’s open environment and positive spillovers, and
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This emphasis on openness generated positive spillovers from innovation,
a more efficient labor market, and a reduced time-to-market period for
many new technologies.96 Massachusetts’s technology corridor along
Route 128, the Valley’s chief competitor, was home to a very different
professional culture featuring a much more closed environment, rendering it unable to match Silicon Valley’s growth.
Silicon Valley engineers pursued this enforcement path—declining
to codify their norms in formal multilateral contracts and instead enforcing their commitment to mutually beneficial behavior through professional and social exclusion—for primarily the same reasons Shasta
County residents relied on self-enforced norms. Enforcement through
private ordering is far less costly than litigation, entrants into the profession are as committed to the same professional norms as current engineers and therefore do not threaten the reigning professional culture,
and vertical integration would lead to prohibitive bureaucratic costs. The
same logic can be applied to a long list of other professions with mutually
beneficial, wealth-enhancing norms.97
A collective commitment to a similar set of professional norms has
recently enabled software engineers to organize in an unusual and highly
effective system of production. The open source software movement, discussed in Yochai Benkler’s Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of
the Firm,98 introduces an interesting twist to the traditional market-versus-firm paradigm because free software projects “do not rely either on
subsequent economic growth, to the refusal of California judges and juries to enforce
trade secret law); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575,
578 (1999) (crediting California’s refusal to enforce noncompete contracts with fueling
state’s technology employment growth).
96. See Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao, Innovation, Knowledge Flow, and Worker
Mobility 4–5 (May 2003), available at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~yao/
SVsubmitjune03.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (identifying certain efficiencies
when engineers can command a commitment to openness from employers and explaining
that firms consequently will adopt open environments to recruit employees in a tight labor
market).
97. Two other scholars have similarly observed that when scientists collectively
commit to professional norms of cooperation, they are able to force their employers to
foster open environments that permit sharing research. Under such a regime, scientists
benefit from collaboration and enjoy the rents of more efficient research. Paul David
writes that, historically, scientists have been able to establish “open science institutions”
when they have negotiation leverage over prospective employees. See Paul A. David,
Common Agency Contracting and the Emergence of “Open Science” Institutions, 88 Am.
Econ. Rev. 15, 19 (1998). Arti Rai also reports that early molecular biologists developed
professional norms of “communalism” where “[p]roperty rights in science are whittled
down to a bare minimum by the rationale of the scientific ethic.” See Arti Kaur Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
Nw. U. L. Rev. 77, 88–90 (1999) (citing Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of
Science, in The Sociology of Science 267, 273 (1973)).
98. Benkler, supra note 3.
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markets or on managerial hierarchies” for organization.99 Instead, open
source projects employ what Benkler called a “[c]ommons-based peer
production,”100 where value—in the form of useful computer code—is
created by synergies and cooperation between programmers.
Normally, scholars note, the generation of value from collaboration
and coordination of inputs best occurs within a firm because outside the
firm property rights are difficult to define and pro rata contributions in
team production are difficult to observe.101 In the open software movement, however, programmers abide by a professional community norm
where participants do not demand direct compensation for their contributions.102 The absence of demands for compensation negates the need
for firm organization, yet finding the appropriate synergies—locating the
programmers who create the optimal matches—is of the utmost importance. Benkler argued that the open source commons, like markets and
unlike hierarchical organization, permits the wide dissemination of information and enables potential programming collaborators to find their
optimal partners easily. Much as cotton suppliers find mills or diamond
wholesalers find jewelry manufacturers, open source programmers em99. Id. at 372. But see David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software,
2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241, 268–70 (arguing that open source projects rely on clusters that
provide hierarchical control).
100. Benkler, supra note 3, at 375.
101. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 794–95 (1972) (describing firms as
presenting most efficient model of team productive activity).
102. But see Siobhán O’Mahony, Guarding the Commons: How Community
Managed Software Projects Protect Their Work, 32 Res. Pol’y 1179, 1187–91 (2003)
(observing that community-managed software projects pursue both legal (chiefly licensing
agreements) and nonlegal (social sanctions) tactics to protect their intellectual property
rights, a protection that allows “a project’s intellectual property to be publicly and freely
available and yet, governable”). O’Mahony nonetheless agrees that “[i]n the eyes of both
legal scholars and informants [her interviewees], the [General Public License]’s strength
stems not necessarily from its legality, but from the public collective opinion of community
members.” Id. at 1189.
How programmers receive compensation, or more generally, why they are motivated
to expend resources and effort to open source projects, is a provocative puzzle that has
generated multiple explanations. See James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas, Daedalus, Spring
2002, at 13, 23 (observing that “the Internet is one big experiment in distributed cultural
production”); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J.
Indus. Econ. 197, 199 (2002) (attempting to explain open source projects according to
industrial organization and labor economics theories); Eric von Hippel, Innovation by
User Communities: Learning from Open-Source Software, M.I.T. Sloan Mgmt. Rev.,
Summer 2001, at 82, 86 (observing growing academic focus on “phenomenon of user
innovation communities” and noting subject’s changing nature); Karim R. Lakhani &
Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in
Free/Open Source Software Projects 15 (M.I.T. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
4425-03, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=443040
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (considering “impact of the personal sense of
creativity” on software developers).
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ploy market organization to find value-creating matches.103 However, unlike markets and like hierarchies, the open source commons then provides a forum for the coordination of multiple interlocking and
cooperative projects.104 This unusual system of economic organization
illustrates the power of professional norms. When norms remove the desire to secure appropriability—or, as Benkler says, when “the problems of
motivation” are solved105—then the comparative advantages of both market organization and coordinated adaptation can take hold, making possible a highly effective system of production.106
In sum, Shasta County ranchers, Silicon Valley engineers, and open
source programmers employ self-enforced norms to induce mutually beneficial behavior at costs that public courts cannot match and with benefits
that would be lost under a public ordering regime.
IV. THE MODEL

AND

ITS ANTECEDENTS: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
AND PRIVATE ORDERING

The two bodies of literature that set the stage for this Essay, transaction cost economics and private ordering scholarship, provide both foundations and points of departure for the underlying analysis. The foundations relied upon here have been explored sufficiently in the previous
Parts, but it is worth discussing in greater depth how this Essay differs
from and contributes to previous work in both of those areas.
103. Benkler, supra note 3, at 376 (noting that open source “provides a framework
within which individuals who have the best information available about their own fit for a
task can self-identify for the task”).
104. Chester Barnard is credited for noting the capacity of hierarchical firms to
induce economic cooperation. See Barnard, supra note 67, at 4 (“Formal organization is
that kind of co[o]peration among men that is conscious, deliberate, [and] purposeful.”).
Oliver Williamson credits Barnard for sparking the “incipient science of organization” in
which cooperative adaptation is recognized as a valuable attribute of hierarchical
organizations. See Williamson, MOG, supra note 10, at 29–30. For a rich, and to date the
most complete, discussion of the institutional attributes of commons-based property rights,
see Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action 27 (1990) (identifying “underlying design principles of the institutions used by
those who have successfully managed their own” common pool resources).
105. Benkler, supra note 3, at 376.
106. Note that Benkler’s article and this Essay jointly suggest that the applicability of
transaction cost theory extends deeply into unusual forms of organization. Specifically,
unusual systems of economic organization emerge in response to the atypical
circumstances where certain aspects of markets and certain aspects of hierarchies are in
demand. The model formulated here argues that private ordering emerges when the
benefits of disseminating information and instituting high-powered incentives are high,
the need for transactional governance is high, and the costs of entry barriers are low.
Benkler’s parallel analysis discusses a situation where the benefits of disseminating
information and instituting high-powered incentives are high, the need for transactional
governance is low, and the need for collaboration and coordinated team production is
high. Both constitute useful tweakings of transaction cost theory.
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A. Transaction Cost Economics
Several economists have previously recognized that private mechanisms arise to enforce contracts where public instruments are ineffective.107 In modeling how a repeat purchase context creates a marketbased contract enforcement mechanism, Benjamin Klein and Keith Leffler challenged the “implicit assumption . . . of the legal-philosophical
tradition upon which the economic model is built [that] without some
third-party enforcer to sanction stealing and reneging, market exchange
would be impossible.”108 Oliver Williamson put the relationship directly,
writing that “the incentives of private parties to devise bilateral contractual safeguards [are] a function of the efficacy of court adjudication,
and . . . var[y] with the attributes of transactions.”109 The notion that
transactors successfully operate outside the law is not new.
This scholarship has produced some useful models that can explain
certain instances of private ordering, but it chiefly addressed contexts
that are materially different from those discussed in Parts I and III. One
category of models, led by the Klein and Leffler template, depicts how
market-based reputation mechanisms induce firms to comply with their
pledges for high quality.110 These reputation models are limited,
though, in that they illustrate only how a market can enforce quality
promises by relying chiefly on separation equilibria and do not evaluate
the efficiency of the market mechanism in relation to institutional alternatives. It also is significant that the models involve sales in the general
flow of commerce and do not approximate actual contractual relationships between identifiable parties. Moreover, some of these models explicitly provide for free entry, which is antithetical to the realities of private ordering systems. In short, this body of literature models
107. The approach employed here and discussed throughout this Essay is one that
identifies certain structural deficiencies in the public courts that private actors must
overcome. It is to be distinguished from the perspective, pervasive in legal scholarship,
that identifies shortcomings in the public courts and in contract law and aims to improve
both. For examples of the latter, see Llewellyn, supra note 39, at 705; see also Clyde W.
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 Yale L.J. 525, 527 (1969).
For a wonderful critique of these approaches to contract law, which are embodied in the
Uniform Commercial Code, see Bernstein, Business Norms, supra note 5, at 1766
(challenging UCC’s philosophy of seeking “immanent business norms” in deciding cases).
108. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615, 615–16 (1981); see also L.G. Telser, A
Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27, 30 (1980) (examining situations in
which self-enforcing agreements may occur).
109. Williamson, MOG, supra note 10, at 122–23.
110. See David Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J.
Econ. Theory 253, 275–77 (1982) (presenting game theory models that reveal the effects
of imperfect information); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and
Entry Deterrence, 27 J. Econ. Theory 280, 281 (1982) (highlighting predation as a
“rational, profit-maximizing strategy” and examining effects of predation on reputation);
Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation, 98 Q.J. Econ.
659, 659–60 (1983) (modeling effect of reputation in perfect competition).
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phenomena very different from those of interest here. A closer analog is
the examination of private ordering in the bilateral context, where two
contracting parties elect to provide each other with the capacity to impose severe ex post sanctions should either one breach. Labeled a “hostage exchange,” this latter model resembles a simplistic portrayal of the
system of private ordering, where one party’s capacity to inflict harm on
the other party in the event of a breach, and vice versa, allows both parties ex ante to commit credibly to fulfill their obligations (the assurance
of coordinated punishment in multilateral systems is the counterpart to
the bilateral hostage exchange).111 The shift from the bilateral paradigm
to the multilateral models discussed in Parts I and III, however, requires a
distinctly different application of the transaction cost model. Chiefly, entry barriers do not factor into the analysis of bilateral private ordering. In
the bilateral setting, the identity of the transactors is fixed, and the focus
of the examination is on a single transactional relationship. The multilateral setting, however, sees a changing landscape of differently paired relationships in a system that organizes a multitude of transactions. The multilateral context, therefore, is longitudinal and dynamic, and the
existence of entry barriers would ultimately be very costly.
The importance of entry barriers in the multilateral context, and
their absence in the bilateral context, requires a revision to the
unidimensional transaction cost model. The transaction cost template
characterizes bilateral ordering as a hybrid that occupies an intermediate
location along a unidimensional spectrum spanning from markets to
firms. As such a hybrid, it enjoys greater transactional security than the
unregulated market and, correspondingly, greater incentive intensity
than the hierarchical firm.112 If the transaction in question requires
greater governance, the transaction cost model predicts that the transactors will tend toward vertical integration, but barring a need for that additional assurance, the parties will remain autonomous and continue to enjoy the efficiencies of high-powered market incentives. In short, there is a
single tradeoff between market incentives and transactional security—
markets provide the first, hierarchies provide the second—and bilateral
private ordering negotiates a certain balance between the two
considerations.
Incorporating the additional variable of entry barriers into the multilateral setting, however, involves an entirely new tradeoff between entry
availability and transactional security—public courts provide the first and
private ordering provides the second. The consequence of adding a second tradeoff to the transaction cost paradigm requires altering the predictive template in a substantial way. Private ordering occupies not
111. See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 10, at 519–22 (arguing that
“the economic equivalents of hostages [are] widely used to effect credible commitments”).
112. See Williamson, MOG, supra note 10, at 101–05 (noting that “hybrid mode . . .
elicits strong incentives” and contains “long-term contracts [that] are supported by added
contractual safeguards and administrative apparatus”).
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merely an intermediate location between markets and firms but is instead
a distinct system of economic organization that requires independent
comparisons with markets and firms. The analysis therefore requires use
of three variables—market incentives, transactional security, and entry
barriers—to evaluate three separate governance mechanisms—firms,
markets, and private ordering. Depending on the needs of the underlying transaction, the model’s analysis can then predict which one mechanism will excel above the others.
Put simply, moving from the bilateral to the multilateral context requires the introduction of an additional variable, availability of entry,
which in turn requires consideration of a second tradeoff, entry versus
transactional security. Incorporating the second tradeoff to the transaction cost model therefore requires revising the unidimensional model
into the 3x3 chart depicted in Figure 1. The result is a more nuanced
and more complicated model that must account for more variables. But
it also represents an extension of transaction cost theory into new territory, even while the model retains transaction cost theory’s parsimonious
methodology and fundamental principles.
B. Private Ordering Literature
The primary departure in this Essay from previous scholarship on
private ordering lies in its comparison between private ordering and
other alternatives. Two contributions are worth noting. First, the comparison here includes an assessment of the institutional competencies of
the vertically integrated firm, which distinguishes this model from the
“legal centralism” approach discussed in the Introduction.113 That additional consideration, which is a product of combining the private ordering literature with transaction cost theory, is at the core of this Essay and
is likely its most important contribution.
The second, and less apparent, contribution lies in this Essay’s placing a premium on institutional capacities to ensure transactional assurance, whereas previous works have placed a premium on administrative
costs. Earlier scholarship compared the costliness of employing state
courts with the efficiency, speed, and accuracy afforded by private legal
systems, arguing that merchant communities opt for private ordering in
order to capture these savings. Construction of a private ordering system,
these works maintain, is thus a deliberate choice114 in that the state
courts remain a viable but merely less preferable option, leaving private
ordering in the “shadow” of otherwise enforceable law.115
113. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
114. The classification of the deliberate choice inherent in the arrival at private
ordering over public courts is evident from the title of Lisa Bernstein’s seminal work,
“Opting Out of the Legal System.” See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5.
115. See supra note 6 (discussing “shadow of the law” analyses). The vast majority of
legal scholarship that examines private ordering in modern economies professes to occur
within the “shadow of the law,” where the law still offers a viable, though less desirable,
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However, the literature’s emphasis on administrative costs is misplaced. Certainly, the prior scholarship’s detailing of certain administrative savings afforded by private enforcement systems is important since
those savings are far from trivial. However, as is noted in Part II, the
vertically integrated firm achieves the same administrative efficiencies.
Thus, while those efficiencies reveal significant insights into the shortcomings of our state courts, they cannot explain the arrival at private law.
More importantly, administrative costs simply are not the relevant explanatory variable. What truly drives the creation—really, the necessity—of
private enforcement systems is the incapacity of public courts to assure
transactional security. Administrative savings from private enforcement
are only a secondary, albeit useful, consequence that emerges after the
need for private ordering becomes apparent.
The following hypothetical illustrates this last point. Suppose a
merchant community requires all of its members to use contracts that,
should a disagreement arise, compel disputing parties to use a private
dispute resolution forum with preselected arbitrators, industry-tailored
law, and strict limitations on costly components of litigation such as discovery. All such arbitration agreements would be enforceable in public
courts. Courts would uphold and enforce any conclusions by the arbitrators, and pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act116 and similar state law
provisions, courts would even stay any parallel litigation before them that
is subject to an arbitration agreement.117 Consequently, the industry
could leave enforcement entirely to state courts while maintaining a private legal forum. This would be the best of both worlds: all the administrative savings from the privately tailored substantive law and procedures,
yet no need to rely on reputation mechanisms, nonlegal sanctions, or any
recourse. See generally Ellickson, supra note 11 (investigating private dispute resolution
in rural setting); Bernstein, Business Norms, supra note 5 (using merchant law to
challenge “the idea that courts should seek to discover and apply immanent business
norms in deciding cases”); Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5; Bernstein, Cotton, supra
note 5; Macaulay, supra note 10 (highlighting the importance of occupational role in
noncontractual business relations). Macaulay and Ellickson explicitly noted instances
where the same agreements that were enforced privately were also enforced in state courts
whenever one of the disputing parties was shortsighted. In contrast, examinations of
private ordering in developing nations, in early America, and in illegal circles operate
under the premise that there is no viable state court alternative to enforce agreements, and
thus are beyond this shadow. See supra notes 19–20. The examination here is unique in
that it claims to examine private ordering in modern economies that are still beyond the
shadow of public courts.
116. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
117. See id. § 3 (“If any suit . . . be brought in any . . . court[ ] of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration . . . the court . . . shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had . . . .”); see also
Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from the Middle and the Digital
Ages 17 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
195, Mar. 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220252
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“‘Private’ arbitration is a creature of contract and
so is as much a matter of ‘public’ law as any contract.”).
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other instruments of private enforcement that, necessarily, erect costly
entry barriers.
However, the literature on private legal systems reveals no such mosaic of public enforcement and private dispute resolution. We instead
observe private ordering accompanying private substantive law and with it
the pervasive reliance on reputation mechanisms despite their significant
costs. This is because administrative savings are only of secondary importance, where the primary factor driving parties towards private ordering—consistent with the transaction cost approach and the comparative
institutional analysis in Part II—is the ability of courts versus other instruments to enforce agreements.
In short, the approach in this Essay departs from previous private
ordering scholarship in two respects: It relates private ordering to alternative governance mechanisms, including the firm, in comparative institutional analysis, and it bases that analysis on the institutional capacities
to induce contractual enforcement rather than on basic administrative
costs. These are departures of significant import, and they allow for
transaction cost theory to bring a firmer theoretical foundation to the
budding literature on private ordering.
CONCLUSION
The literature on private law is replete with fascinating stories: fishmongers in a Congolese village berating cheaters, Ultra-Orthodox Jewish
diamond merchants and their allocation of religious honors, medieval
merchants organizing transcontinental trade, and the underworld of illegal activity. What the literature largely has lacked, to date, is a theoretical
superstructure that unites it with other institutional theory and explains
why some industries, in contrast to most, persistently reject public courts
even after the emergence of a sophisticated legal system. Such a theoretical foundation is critical to developing a broader understanding of the
role and utility of private ordering, and the positive model presented
here takes steps towards articulating the specific circumstances where private ordering is superior to rival systems of contract enforcement. Understanding the circumstances under which merchants reject state courts will
generate valuable insights into the shortcomings of those public institutions, and a systematic theory that identifies those shortcomings will, in
turn, plant the seeds for a constructive agenda for institutional reform.
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